С любовью ко всем разработчикам на свете ❤️
@point0/basic-auth is an HTTP Basic auth gate. basicAuth(options) returns a
Point0 middleware function: give it a user table, mount it on a
point, and every request without valid username:password credentials gets a
401. It runs server-side only and adds per-user / per-IP brute-force
throttling.
The most direct use is to close your whole site off — a staging deploy, a
private preview, an internal tool. Mount it on root and the browser pops its
native login dialog before anyone reaches a single page:
import { basicAuth } from '@point0/basic-auth'
export const root = Point0.lets
.root()
// ...
// every request under root needs admin:secret first
.middleware(basicAuth({ users: { admin: 'secret' } }))
.root()No page knows or cares it's there.
basicAuth(...) is a plain Point0 middleware, so it goes wherever
.middleware goes. Three useful placements:
Guard everything on a point. Pass it straight to .middleware() and it
gates every request reaching that point's scope — this is the whole-site gate
from above:
// guards every request under root
.middleware(basicAuth({ users: { admin: 'secret' } }))Guard one path. .middleware also takes a route, so you can scope the gate
to a subtree — e.g. an /admin/* area while the rest of the site stays open:
.middleware('/admin/*', basicAuth({ users: { admin: 'secret' } }))Guard the OpenAPI docs. Pass it as the before option of
openapi(...), which runs it only on the doc routes. This is how
every shipped example uses it:
import { openapi } from '@point0/openapi'
// examples/basic/src/lib/root.tsx
.middleware(
openapi({
route: '/openapi.json',
scalar: '/scalar',
swagger: '/swagger',
filter: 'all',
before: basicAuth({ users: { admin: 'admin' } }), // ← the gate
}),
)Now /openapi.json, /scalar, and /swagger prompt for a login; anything else
stays open.
basicAuth is a no-op on the client — middleware runs server-side only, and
the compiler strips server middleware bodies out of the client bundle.
usersusers is the built-in credential check. It accepts three shapes, all
normalized to a { username: password } record:
basicAuth({ users: { admin: 'secret', john: 'pass123' } }) // record
basicAuth({ users: 'admin:secret' }) // single "user:pass" string
basicAuth({ users: ['admin:secret', 'john:pass123'] }) // list of "user:pass" stringsUse the string form in production — keep the credentials in an env var, not in
source. This is what create-point0-app scaffolds and what Start0 ships:
// packages/create-app/template/src/lib/root.tsx
before: basicAuth({ users: serverEnv.OPENAPI_CREDENTIALS }) // e.g. "admin:admin"A "user:pass" string splits on the first :, so the password may itself
contain colons. An empty username or empty password (':pass', 'user:', or a
string with no :) throws at config time — when basicAuth(...) is called,
not per request:
basicAuth({ users: 'admin:' }) // throws: Invalid user string format. Expected "username:password".Passwords are compared as plaintext with strict ===, guarded by
hasOwnProperty (so prototype keys like toString can't be used as a login).
There's no hashing — for hashed passwords or a database lookup, use validator
below.
validatorPass a validator function instead of users to replace the built-in table
entirely. It receives the parsed credentials plus the full request,
returns a boolean, and may be async:
basicAuth({
validator: async ({ username, password, request }) => {
const user = await db.user.findUnique({ where: { username } })
return !!user && (await verifyHash(password, user.passwordHash))
},
})users and validator are mutually exclusive — pass exactly one. The type
is a discriminated union, so passing both (or neither) is a compile error.
Three optional callbacks fire on each failure path, before the failure response is built — for logging or metrics. They may be async (and are awaited) but can't change the response:
basicAuth({
users: { admin: 'secret' },
onUnauthorized: ({ ip }) => console.warn('no credentials', { ip }),
onWrongCredentials: ({ username, ip }) =>
console.warn('bad credentials', { username, ip }),
onLimitExceeded: ({ username, ip }) =>
console.error('throttled', { username, ip }),
})onLimitExceeded also receives limitPerUser, limitPerIp, and staleTimeMs.
All three receive { request, username, ip } (username/ip may be
undefined).
The gate produces three outcomes, each a real HTTP response:
| Case | Status | Body | WWW-Authenticate |
|---|---|---|---|
| no / malformed header | 401 | Unauthorized | sent (unless challenge: false) |
| wrong credentials | 401 | Unauthorized | sent (unless challenge: false) |
| too many failures | 429 | Too many failed HTTP auth attempts. Limit exceeded. | never sent |
The WWW-Authenticate header is the constant
Basic realm="Restricted", charset="UTF-8" — it's what makes a browser pop its
native login dialog. The realm is fixed to "Restricted" and the charset to
UTF-8; there is no option to change either.
The Basic scheme is matched case-insensitively, so Basic, basic, and
BASIC all parse.
challenge: false — suppress the browser dialogSet challenge: false to drop the WWW-Authenticate header from 401s —
useful for an API where you handle the 401 in your own client and don't want a
browser prompt:
basicAuth({ users: { admin: 'secret' }, challenge: false }) // 401s carry no WWW-AuthenticateThe 429 never carries the challenge header, even with challenge: true.
Every failed credential attempt (a valid Basic header with a wrong
username/password) is recorded in memory as { dateMs, username, ip }. Requests
with no or malformed header are not counted toward the throttle. Once a client
crosses a limit, further attempts return 429 instead of 401:
basicAuth({
users: { admin: 'secret' },
limitPerUser: 100, // max failures per username (default 100)
limitPerIp: 100, // max failures per IP (default 100)
staleTimeMs: 1000 * 60 * 60 * 24, // failures older than this are forgotten (default 24h)
memorySize: 1000, // hard cap on remembered attempts (default 1000)
})The limit trips when either the per-user or the per-IP count is reached
(they're OR-combined). A successful login clears every recorded failure matching
that IP or that username — so a login from one user can also wipe another
user's recorded failures that share the same IP. The IP comes from
request.from.ip (Bun's trusted source first, then x-forwarded-for
/ x-real-ip / cf-connecting-ip); requests with no resolvable IP all share
one 'unknown' bucket.
Gotcha — the memory is in-process and volatile. It resets on restart and is per-instance. Across multiple server processes, the limit counts per process, not globally. There's no shared / persistent store option.
basicAuth(options) is the high-level factory. The package also exposes a
lower-level surface:
BasicAuth.create(options) — the class behind the factory (the
constructor is private). Its .middleware getter is exactly what
basicAuth() returns. validateRequest and getFailureResponse are methods
on a BasicAuth instance, not separate top-level exports.instance.validateRequest(request) — returns the full
BasicAuthValidationResult ({ ok, username, ip, response, reason } on
failure) instead of acting as middleware.instance.getFailureResponse(request) — returns the failure Response,
or undefined when the request is authorized. For gating by hand, outside
.middleware().getBasicAuthHeader(username, password) — a top-level export that builds
a Basic <base64> header value, for crafting authenticated requests in tests.basicAuth(options)Exactly one of users / validator is required; everything else is optional.
| Option | Type | Default | What |
|---|---|---|---|
users | Record<user,pass> | "user:pass" | string[] | — | built-in credential table (mutually exclusive with validator) |
validator | ({ username, password, request }) => boolean | Promise | — | custom check, replaces users |
challenge | boolean | true | send WWW-Authenticate on 401 (browser login dialog) |
limitPerUser | number | 100 | max failed attempts per username before 429 |
limitPerIp | number | 100 | max failed attempts per IP before 429 |
staleTimeMs | number | 86_400_000 | how long a failed attempt is remembered (24h) |
memorySize | number | 1000 | hard cap on remembered attempts |
onUnauthorized | ({ request, username, ip }) => void | — | hook: no / bad header |
onWrongCredentials | ({ request, username, ip }) => void | — | hook: wrong credentials |
onLimitExceeded | ({ request, username, ip, limitPerUser, limitPerIp, staleTimeMs }) => void | — | hook: throttled |
| Aspect | Behavior |
|---|---|
| Side | server-only — a no-op on the client |
| Scheme | Basic matched case-insensitively |
Password with : | allowed — "user:pass" splits on the first : only |
| Empty user / pass | throws at config time, not per request |
| Password comparison | plaintext ===, hasOwnProperty-guarded — no hashing |
| Realm / charset | fixed Basic realm="Restricted", charset="UTF-8" — not configurable |
| Throttle limits | per-user OR per-IP; in-memory, volatile, per-process |
| Missing IP | bucketed under 'unknown' |